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Abstract
This study examines the political process of promulgating the draft laws 22169 and 22896, which pertained
to the reporting of financial conglomerates, the lobbying efforts observed during the process, and the
interaction between the government, the supervisors of banks and insurance companies, the industry and its
associations, and the users and auditors of annual reports of bancassurance firms. Pluralism is used to derive
predictions on the regulation process. These predictions are then tested and compared with hypotheses which
are comparable in terms of explanatory power and which were based on elite theory, neo-corporatism and
Marxism. Pluralism seemed to provide fairly accurate predictions, in this particular case.
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On January 1, 1990, the general separation between banks and insurance firms in the Netherlands was
abolished. This separation had been based on the ’structure policy’ of the Dutch Central Bank ’De
Nederlandsche Bank’(hereafter, DNB) (DNB, 1989: 111). Subsequently, a merger and co-operation
movement was set in motion, which resulted in the establishment of a number of financial conglomerates,
otherwise known as mixed financial companies. These included the co-operation between AMEV, VSB and
the Belgian AG under the name Fortis, the expansion of the participation of RABO in Interpolis, and, finally,
the merger of Nationale Nederlanden and NMB Postbankgroep, now known as ING (DNB, 1990: 124).
Running parallel to this development was the implementation of the EC directive regarding annual reports of
banks and other financial institutions.
1 The stipulations of this directive are incorporated in section 14 of title
9 book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code. Title 9 of the Civil Code is integrally applicable to banks unless it is
explicitly stipulated otherwise in section 14. Furthermore, the EC directive regarding annual reports of
insurance companies was laid down on December 19, 1991. The incorporation of this directive in section 15
of title 9 book 2 Civil Code was established by publication in the Staatsblad (Statute Book) on October 14,
1993 (Staatsblad, 1993, no. 517). The establishment of mixed financial companies was not anticipated when
the EC directives were drafted. Therefore, there were no references in the directives to the annual reports of
these conglomerates. The national legislature now had the opportunity to stipulate reporting requirements for
financial companies which engage in banking as well as insurance services. The lacunae in European law
made it possible to conduct research in the Netherlands regarding the legislative process, without European
influences obfuscating the issue.
It should be noted that reporting requirements for banks and insurance companies differ. Mixed financial
companies, however, are not subjected to the legislation of banks nor to the legislation of insurance
companies. The following questions can be raised concerning the reports issued by these companies:
- Should both activities be consolidated into one annual report?
- When the activities are consolidated, what method of valuation should be used?
- How should the balance sheet and income statement be presented?
- What separate information on the segments should be given?
2
Moreover, a special property of banks and insurance companies should be noted; they are supervised by De
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the ’Verzekeringskamer’ (Insurance Chamber), respectively.
At the moment, it is not clear whether all the parties involved will answer these questions identically. It
could be expected that if the interests are large enough, parties will try to influence the legislature in order to
get their views reflected in the reporting requirements. An interesting question is whether economic theory
can predict what will, in the end (equilibrium), be the result of the actions of the parties involved. These
1 This directive should have been incorporated in national law before December 31, 1990. However,
the bill containing the requirements of this directive was published in the Staatsblad on May 27,
1993 (Staatsblad, 1993, no. 258).
2 The four questions are taken from Van der Tas (1993: 189).
-2-actions might be predicted using pluralist theory.
3 The shortcomings of this theory are that no predictions or
explanations are presented about the process leading to equilibrium. In order to establish a ’richer’ theory, a
process view appears to be necessary.
The goal of this paper is to test the predictions of pluralist theory in a special accounting setting, namely, the
case of the regulation of financial reporting by financial conglomerates. Those predictions are then compared
with other explanatory theories on the political process. In addition, an attempt is made to provide a fuller
understanding of the political decision-making process. The actions of the parties involved which are aimed
at influencing the political decision-maker are central to the description of this case. Increasing the
understanding of the phenomenon ’influence attempts’ is relevant to policy makers because it gives them the
opportunity to react adequately to these actions. The parties involved, however, may be able to formulate a
better strategy if they can increase their understanding of the regulation process. Section 2 of this paper
contains an overview of theories on the political process. In section 3, the results of the research are
presented and discussed. These results include a fuller description of the institutional framework, which was
briefly introduced above. Section 4 contains an analysis of the results of the research obtained by comparing
the data with the predictions which follow from the theories on the political process. Finally, some
concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
2. Theories on the political process
Scholars of the political process in the modern capitalist state have come up with four possible explanations
of, or views on, the role of the state, which have been incorporated into the pluralist, elite, Marxist and (neo-
)corporatist theories respectively (Ham and Hill, 1988). The pluralist views have pervaded accounting theory,
especially in the writings of the Rochester school (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1979; Holthausen and
Leftwich, 1981; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981 and Kelly, 1983). Marxist thought has been given attention
by Tinker (1984), although he calls it a radical approach. Few studies in accounting use an alternative
explanatory framework. Recent work by Walker and Robinson (1994), for example, rejects corporatism as an
applicable model as it may not adequately describe the dynamics of regulatory process on particular issues.
Walker and Robinson employ a model of organisational conflict, as developed by Baysinger (1984). Such a
theory of organisational conflict, however, is not as much a theory on the role of the state, or the political
process, as it is a recognition of the non-monolithic character of the state, in that it recognizes that
governmental institutions can have conflicting interests. Also, elite theory does not seem to have received
much attention by accounting scholars. The four models will be briefly outlined and each theory will be
compared to pluralism which is the central theoretical framework in this study.
Pluralism holds that the sources of power are unequally though widely distributed among individuals and
groups within society. The sources of power are distributed non-cumulatively and no one source is dominant.
’Essentially, then, in a pluralist political system power is fragmented and diffused and the basic picture
presented by pluralists is of a political marketplace in which leaders compete for votes ...’ (Ham and Hill,
1988: 28). Consequently, government is seen as an interest group itself, among other interest groups. The
3 Pluralist theory underlies Watts and Zimmerman’s studies (1978, 1979). It is presented in Sutton
(1984) and Lindahl (1987). A recent empirical study using pluralism is provided by Rahman, Ng
and Tower (1994).
-3-outcome of the political process (equilibrium) depends on the relative strength of the interest groups involved
(Becker, 1983; Hirschleifer, 1976). Regulations are demanded and supplied (by government) in order to fulfil
the self-interest of the actors in the process (Peltzman, 1976; Tollison, 1982; McCormick and Tollison, 1981;
Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).
4 Limiting the analysis to accounting-standard setting, such standards are seen
as products of a process in which regulations are set on the strength of the demands of effectively
participating interest groups and to fulfil the needs of the suppliers, i.e., the standard setters (Rahman, Ng
and Tower, 1994). The entrance of an issue in the political process is the result of a perceived crisis (Watts,
1978). Nobes (1991) implies that a wave of take-overs can provide the energy to start a regulatory process.
Elite theory argues that political power is concentrated in the hands of a minority of the population. The
existence of such a political elite is a necessary and indeed inevitable feature of all societies (Mosca, 1939).
In the modern state, the position of elites is related to large-scale organisations in many areas of life,
resulting in different kinds of elites. The sources of elite power are many, e.g., occupation of formal office,
wealth, knowledge; these sources may to a certain extend be cumulative but power does not stem solely from
one source. The coupling of power and the membership in certain organisations, leads to an institutional
view on the political process. Indeed, organisational control and institutional position are seen as key political
resources (cf. Mills, 1956). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) drew attention to the use of political power to
confine discussion to safe issues, in other words to control the political agenda. Elite theory does not seem to
have attracted many accounting scholars, although the notion of non-decisionmaking has been used in several
studies of standard-setting bodies (e.g., Hussein and Ketz, 1991; Booth and Cocks, 1990). In the case at
hand, elite theory can prove to be valuable as the Netherlands is sometimes described as a highly
institutionalised country. Furthermore, since the country is small, one may expect to encounter the same
people in high positions in these institutions, a ruling elite. Indeed, research seems to confirm this position
(Driehuis, 1989; Van der Knoop, 1991; Donkers en Stokman, 1984).
In conclusion, the main difference between pluralism and elite theory seems to lie in the aspect of concentra-
tion and accumulation of power.
Marxism considers the state not as a neutral agent, but as an instrument for class domination. The state’s
main function is to assist the process of capital accumulation, by creating conditions in which capitalists are
able to promote the production of profit. Central in the discussion is the relation between political and
economic power. Capitalism, as a system of social relations, is characterised by inequalities consisting of
restriction of the access to and use of property, and the dependence of some social members on the
marketplace to provide them with the means of subsistence through the realisation of their labour (Ham and
Hill, 1988; Tinker, 1984).
Whereas the pluralist position asserts that economic power is a factor in influencing the political process,
Marxism argues that the sources of economic (and therefore political) power are not diffused, but concen-
trated. The structure of the distribution of the political and economic power reflects the inequalities imposed
by the social relations of capitalism. Whereas Watts and Zimmerman (1978) see the accounting practice as
an outcome of economic events (viz., the solution of a principle-agent problem) Marxism considers the
accounting practice as a reflection of the wealth distribution which is the result of the political process and
4 It should be noted, however, that the self-interest concept is not falsifiable and, therefore, by
explaining all behaviour it explains none (Sterling, 1990).
-4-consequently, of the inequalities in social relations (cf. McCormick and Tollison, 1981).
(Neo-)corporatism argues that the governmental system incorporates major interest groups into the regulatory
process. The effect of incorporation is to maintain harmony and avoid conflict by allowing these groups to
share power (Middlemas, 1979). Schmitter (1974) sees the development of corporatism as a result of the
need to secure conditions of capital accumulation. Capital accumulation is threatened by concentration of
ownership and competition between national economies (cf. Ham and Hill, 1988), therefore the state is
forced to intervene more directly and bargain with political associations. Corporatism emerges because the
state requires the professional expertise that can only be provided by singular hierarchically-ordered and
consensually-led representative monopolies. Such monopolies use their privileged position to achieve their
own interest. Once incorporated in the political process, interest groups become an important instrument in
implementing agreed-upon policies. Thus, interest groups not only present their members’ view before
decisions are reached, but more importantly, they secure compliance from their members in the implementa-
tion stage of the process. The Netherlands have been characterised as a corporatist society (Hague, Harrop
and Breslin, 1993).
It is relevant to note that as pluralism emphasises an upward flow of preference from group members to their
leaders, corporatism stresses the downward flow of influence. Moreover, corporatism is an attempt by the
state to develop a coordinated approach, whereas coordination is absent in pluralism; in pluralism the
outcome of the political process is the result of conflicting interests of different groups, not of an attempt to
harmonise such interests.
In accounting, corporatism has been used to describe how the accounting profession has organised itself or
sought to regulate accounting practice (Walker and Robinson, 1994; Walker, 1987; Willmott, 1986).
An important point to note is that pluralist theories rely heavily on the notion of economic Darwinism, that is
that those institutions, regulations and indeed, accounting methods survive in equilibrium which are the (cost-
)efficient (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Elite theory, Marxism and corporatism are more theories of
strategic behaviour, of power. Such theories analyse behaviour in terms of appliance of power. Tabel 2.1
provides an overview of all four theories.
Regulation implies that certain economic agents are restricted in their implementation of ex ante plans,
therefore, regulation results in wealth transfers (McCormick and Tollison, 1981).
5 This is also true of the
regulation of financial reporting. Choosing between two frameworks of reporting requirements, is similar to
the choice between two wealth distributions (May and Sundem, 1976; Bryant and Thornton, 1983). Since
economic agents are affected in their wealth by regulation, they have an interest in the regulatory process.
All economic agents are potential wealth suppliers as well as demanders. The role of the government is to
grant favours to groups in society, thereby increasing its own control over resources. As noted above,
pluralism contends that all agents act in self-interest, including government agents. The self-interest of
government agents consists of remaining in office (politicians) and thus securing sufficient votes for this
purpose or increasing the size of the agency in which they are employed (civil servants) and thus securing
sufficient funds. Attempts by economic agents to induce the government to grant favours are not without
costs. Information costs occur because agents have to translate proposed legislation into the consequences
5 Except for Pareto-optimal regulation.
-5-such legislation will have for their wealth. Information costs also occur because the position of other agents
has to be identified in order to find potential supporters, so that an estimate of the possibility of a successful
influence attempt can be made (Tollison, 1982). If economic agents consider the costs of lobbying
individually too high, they may combine their interests and undertake collective action. In that case,
organisation costs will be incurred, including the costs of monitoring the free-riding behaviour of individual
members of the group (Sutton, 1984; Lindahl, 1987; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Peltzman, 1976). Finally,
the costs of using a certain lobby method must be considered (Van Schendelen, 1988; Berry, 1977) In
pluralist theory, lobbying or striving for governmental favours is, in the end, a cost/benefit trade-off.
A relevant question is whether it is possible to predict which economic agents will participate in the political
process. It has been stated that owing to the lobbying costs, only agents with substantial expected benefits
will try to secure favours. ’For the preparer of financial statements, the potential benefits of securing his
favored proposal ... are likely to be greater in absolute terms than the benefits to the user obtaining his.’
(Sutton, 1984, p. 85). The stronger propensity of prepares to lobby can be attributed to the fact that, in
general, preparers are wealthier than users. Furthermore, preparers are likely to draw income from limited
sources. Threats to one of these sources, have a greater adverse effect on the income position of preparers
than of users who are usually able to diversify their income portfolio (Sutton, 1984, p. 85). Consequently,
lobby efforts are said to be dependent on the resources at an agent’s disposal (Becker, 1983; Blake, 1973).
One should remember that pluralism contends that resources are widely but unequally distributed, and
therefore lobbying will be undertaken only by certain groups. Moreover, as regulation is a public good, no
agent being excluded from its benefits after implementation, no incentive will exist to contribute to the costs
of lobbying. Unless a cost-sharing rule is agreed upon, lobbying will only be undertaken by those agents
whose expected total benefits exceed their lobbying costs. It seems reasonable to assume that a large agent’s
probability of receiving sufficiently high benefits is higher than a small agent’s. Thus, large agents are
expected to lobby. This is in accordance with with Olson’s (1965, p. 29) observation that ’there is a
systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small.’ Cost-sharing rules, and other measures for
facilitating effective collective action, combined with start-up costs which are incurred when initiating an
organisation which unifies agents with similar interests, leads to the observation that existing organisations
are more likely to undertake lobbying than ad hoc groups. Industry associations are likely candidates to
represent the views of preparers of financial statements. However, since members of a lobby organisation do
not necessarily share identical opinions on all issues or are not involved in all issues, one may expect some
members to trade their support for an issue against reciprocal support of an issue which does involve a
member. Thus, when intensities of preferences over a certain matter, differ between members of a lobbying
group, logrolling may occur, i.e., the agent who feels the strongest preference on an issue will be supported
by other agents (with marginal interests) on the condition that such support is reciprocated in due time.
With regard to the process of political decision-making, the methods and instruments that are used by
economic agents, to put their views on the stage and thereby gain influence over the process, must be
considered.
6 In general, the position of lobbying agents depends on the extentto which their views are
integrated in society (Van Mierlo, 1989). If a certain view is part of the common opinion, softer lobbying
methods will be applied. Sutton (1984) argues that the choice of method depends on the cost-effectiveness of
6 Van Schendelen (1988) provides a fairly complete overview of lobby methods.
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resources and that instruments may differ in terms of resource consumption, effectiveness, and efficiency,
one should not neglect such aspects as culture, historical background, size, the relative importance of the
issue at hand as well as the expertise of a group of agents, as factors explaining a particular choice (Berry,
1977). Many of the methods applied, seem to consist of some form of information transfer from the agent to
the government. Indeed, subsidizing information that supports the position of an agent is generally considered
an important instrument (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979; Bartlett, 1973; Van Schendelen, 1988). Sources of
such favourable information are found in auditors’ technical departments, in academic research and in-
company. Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue that accounting theories are merely provided by academics to
support certain views in the political process. Although such theories frequently refer to the public interest,
they are, in fact, construed to increase the possibility of acceptance of a favoured proposal by the legislator.
Bartlett (1973: 133) provides a similar argument ’much of the pressure placed upon the government ... takes
the form of freely provided ’objective’ studies showing the important outcomes expected from the enactment
of particular policies.’
Another way of transfering one’s view, is simply to participate in the exchange of views when a new
regulation is being discussed. An official
7 of the Federation of Dutch Industries (VNO) stated that lobbying
the political process is most successful when initiated in the early stages of the process, indeed, lobby
attempts should be started even before a proposal or draft has been written. The same official also argued
that private conversations and informal meetings with members of parliament, and government (politicians as
well as civil servants) are the most effective lobbying instruments. This opinion has been supported in
literature (Sutton, 1984; Van Schendelen, 1988).
With regard to the timing of lobbying, it seems to be critical to initiate attempts at influencing as early in the
process as possible (Sutton, 1984; Lindahl, 1987). Once a certain regulation is enacted, the possibility of
changing its implications is limited. However, as Amershi et al. (1982) correctly point out, lobbying is likely
to be a multi-issue, multi-period process, especially for (professional) collective-action organisations such as
industry associations or unions. Consequently, conducting research in one issue may present methodological
problems in that the behaviour of certain lobbying agents can only be understood by taking a long-term view
and considering multiple issues.
Before turning to the case description, the position of the players should be predicted. It seems reasonable to
assume that users of financial statements prefer as much disclosure of information as possible as long as it is
provided freely (Mian and Smith, 1990a). Since disclosed accounting information is a public good (Gonedes
and Dopuch, 1974) additional disclosure will be free. The issue at hand is whether financial conglomerates
should be allowed to consolidate both insurance and bank activities and if so, whether additional, segmented
information on the separate activities is required. Consequently, users will prefer no consolidation or when
consolidation is allowed, they will prefer additional segmented information. It should be noted that
unconsolidated financial statements are generally more informative than consolidated financial statements in
the sense that the information in a set of unconsolidated statements generally allows a user to perform a
’homemade’ consolidation, particularly if the magnitude of the within-group contracting is reported or small;
the reverse is, however, not true (Mian and Smith, 1990a).
Management has incentives to disclose information, for this may reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling,
7 Interview with M.W. Noordzij on July 8, 1994.
-7-1976). In other words, monitoring management’s behaviour through the publication of accounting reports,
may reduce the costs associated with the divergence in interest between the manager and the holders of
outside capital (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 1981), especially, if the manager can produce financial
information at lower costs than the holders of outside equity can. Mian and Smith (1990a) hypothesised that
the more dependent the parent-subsidiary activities, the more likely the subsidiary operations will be reported
on a consolidated basis. Three kinds of interdependencies, operating, information, and financial interdepen-
dencies, can be analyzed. It should be noted that accounting is a basic part of the organisational structure and
that accounting practice and organisational form are related (Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the consolidation
choice may be viewed as an organisational decision. The decision on organisational form can result in
several structures, e.g., a specific activity can be retained within the firm by a department or division,
otherwise it can be contracted to an independent firm. A structure between these extremes would be to have
an activity performed by a subsidiary. Of course, other options are available. Extending Klein, Crawford and
Alchian’s (1978) analysis in which it is argued that the more firm-specific the activity, the more likely it is
that it will be performed within a department or division and the less likely it is that it will be subcontracted
to an independent firm, Mian and Smith (1990a) state that the more interdependent the parent and subsidiary
activities, the more likely the subsidiary’s performance will be reported on a consolidated basis: ’Thus we
suggest that this accounting decision reflects the firm’s choice of organizational structure and is determined
by interdependence between the parent and the subsidiary activities.’ (Mian and Smith, 1990a: 143). This
interdependence hypothesis relies on the proposition that if one set of accounting numbers is reported
internally it will also tend to be reported externally.
Mian and Smith’s (1990a) research considers the consolidation of financial subsidiaries, e.g., the lease
subsidiary of a car manufacturer. This papers studies the consolidation of two more or less equal firms,
which were formerly independent, i.e., a bank and insurance company. Therefore, Mian and Smith’s (1990a)
elaboration of the role of interdependences is paraphrased. The theoretical ideas on organisational form and
accounting are, however, maintained.
Operating interdependence extends to real production activities between parent and their subsidiaries.
Operating interdependences appear to be significant in the financial conglomerates’ case. For example, as
will be shown, financial conglomerates repeatedly uttered the wish to be able to offer their clients a complete
range of financial products. Furthermore, in this age of financial innovation, many financial products include
insurance as well as credit attributes, and cannot, therefore, be characterised as bank or insurance products.
The information interdependence hypothesis implies that for that set of information over which managers
exercise discretion, they must disclose any information for which the incremental benefits exceed the costs,
in order to maximize firm value. This results in the prediction that the higher the potential information costs
associated with the subsidiary’s activities, the more likely those activities are to be reported on a consoli-
dated basis. Such information costs consist of out-of-pocket costs of accounting procedures and the costs
associated with proprietary information, i.e., information that reduces the present value of the firm’s expected
cash flows owing to the publication of information. One could argue that competitive pressures in the
financial markets are high and that, therefore, all performance information will be scrutinized by competitors.
Consequently, information costs could indeed be significant in this case.
Financial interdependence may take two forms, ’personal responsibility’ and ’equity support’. If a parent
takes personal responsibility for a subsidiary’s debts, Dutch law does not require the subsidiary to structure
and disclose its annual report according to the full requirements of title 9. This subsidiary’s financial
information should, however, be consolidated in the consolidated report of the parent. Thus, if personal
-8-responsibility is taken by the parent for a subsidiary, the prediction is that such a subsidiary will be
consolidated.
Banks as credit extending institutions have special obligations to their creditors. In partical a bank’s
shareholder equity and solvency are important in developing and maintaining trust in the abilities of a bank
to observe its contractual obligations. Therefore, if certain subsidiaries receive equity support from the parent
or other subsidiaries within a financial conglomerate, it may be expected that these subsidiaries will
encounter problems in observing their obligations. In light of the importance of trust with regard to banks, it
is often not advisable to report massive equity movements to the public. Equity movements are not visible in
consolidated reports.
Consequently, the higher the interdependence (over all three dimensions), the more likely management will
report on a consolidated basis.
One other group of players deserves some attention, i.e., the auditors of the companies involved. Various
incentives regarding lobbying behavior for accounting firms have been identified in literature which are not
mutually exclusive (Mian and Smith, 1990a). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that accounting firms have
incentives to lobby for standards (i.e., regulation) that increase their value; an increase in value can be
expected if audit fees rise due to increased auditing services which originate in the examination of the
consolidation of, previously, separately-reported activities. Consequently, auditors will favour increased
consolidation. Furthermore, when separate statements on activities are to be provided in order to prevent
information loss, additional auditing activities can be expected, and auditors can be expected to favour such
separate statements, as well. However, auditors have an incentive to support the lobby of their clients
(Haring 1979; Puro, 1984, 1985). Puro shows that in lobbying the FASB, accounting firms do not support
their clients in disclosure matters, however, they are more supportive of their client’s position on technical
issues. Moreover, accounting firms are expected to be more concerned about the position of their large
clients than of their small clients, if audit fees are positively related to firm size (Mian and Smith, 1990a).
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) hypothesise that accounting regulation which restricts the available accounting
procedures will be opposed by auditors. Management would like to have as much discretion in accounting
choice as possible in order to maximize its wealth; restrictions on the acceptable set are, therefore, likely to
be opposed (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Consequently, the interests of management and auditor do not
conflict. Furthermore, they suggest that regulation which increases accounting complexity and thereby raises
audit fees is supported by auditors. The latter hypothesis strengthens the conflict of interest with manage-
ment. Since management will have an incentive to decrease audit fees it will oppose accounting regulation
that raises complexity. As stated at the beginning of this paragraph, the incentives that auditors face are not
mutually exclusive, but they may be in conflict. The result of this conflict depends on the relative strength of
each incentive.
3. The case: financial conglomerates in the Netherlands
3.1 The Dutch regulatory process
To understand the political process in the development of the legislature pertaining to reporting by financial
conglomerates, it is necessary to have some knowledge of Dutch regulatory processes. A useful
characterisation of the Dutch regulation of financial reporting is provided by Zeff et al. (1992: 367).
"Parliamentary companies legislation has prescribed certain financial reporting practices. Self-regulation
stimulated by the government occurs in the private sector, but within a private-sector framework: statements
embodying guidelines are issued, but without any monitoring by the government. Interested parties and the
-9-Attorney-General (when in the public interest) may initiate a judicial proceeding in a special court to require
companies to adhere to the statutory prescriptions; efforts to promote compliance with the private-sector
guidelines are limited to confidential discussions with the auditors of companies that apparently are departing
from guidelines." Using Puxty’s et al. (1987) regulatory classification scheme, Zeff et al. (1992) feels that
the Netherlands reflects the dual influence of Associationism and Legalism, while it is also tinged by a shade
of Corporatism. Although it is clear that any classification has its limitations, Zeff’s proposal, using three out
of four categories to characterise the Dutch regulatory environment, is not satisfying. Given the resemblance
between the Dutch and the English regulatory process and given Puxty’s classification of England as
Associationist, it would be best to classify the Netherlands as Associationist.
In addition, it can be stated that the guiding principle of the institutional framework of corporate financial
reporting in the Netherlands consists of a system of ’frame legislation’ in which, wittingly, only the main
lines of corporate annual reporting have been regulated. The frame legislation on annual reporting is vested
in company law. Company law in the European Community is subject to a policy of harmonisation. This is
apparent in the fourth EC Directive pertaining to annual reports of companies. This directive stipulates
requirements on structure, disclosure, and audit of the annual report. As of December 30, 1983 Dutch law
has incorporated this fourth directive. Furthermore, the seventh EC Directive is of importance, this directive
stipulates requirements for the consolidated annual report. Dutch company law was adjusted to the
requirements of the seventh directive by the Act of November 13, 1988.
The legislative frame is laid down foremost in the terms of title 9 of book 2 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk
Wetboek) and title 11 of book 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering).
Title 9 Book 2 contains requirements regarding the structure (inrichting), disclosure and audit of the balance
sheet, the profit and loss statement, and the notes to these statements. It also contains requirements pertaining
to the management discussion and analysis of the financial condition and results of operations (jaarverslag)
and the other data (overige gegevens). Title 11 of Book 3 Code of Civil Procedure pertains to the judicial
administration of title 9 Book 2 of the Civil Code.
As Zeff et al. (1992) stated, private sector regulation within a private sector framework does occur. The
Council on Annual Reporting, in which various interest groups are represented, issues guidelines. The
Council contains representatives of preparers (employers), users (employees/unions/financial analysts) and
auditors. The guidelines of the Council elaborate on the stipulations of the frame legislation. The guidelines
themselves, however, do not have the force of law.
Reviewing the institutions and processes of Dutch reporting regulation, the conclusion may be drawn that
some knowledge of the general process of enacting laws in the Netherlands is necessary in order to
understand reporting regulation. Owing to the similarity between the Dutch legislative process and many
other democratic legislative processes, I will not dwell on a formal discription of the procedures. Rather, they
will become clear in the chronological part of the case study. A brief introduction to the process, however,
can be obtained in Zeff et al. (1992).
Zeff et al. (1992) states some special characteristics of financial reporting regulation in the Netherlands,
including the irrelevance of tax laws, the absence of a securities commission, the absence of a ’standards’
program and the observation that managers’ bonuses based on profit are not a pervasive practice. Moreover,
the comparability of annual reports is not a governing consideration in the regulation of Dutch financial
reporting. Indeed, a different criterion is the guiding principle, i.e., the insight requirement. Financial
-10-statements should furnish the insight required to enable the formation of a sound judgment as to the
company’s financial position and the result of operations, and, to the extent possible, into solvency and
liquidity (Zeff et al. 1992: 27). This insight requirement plays an important role in the bancassurance case,
as will be shown.
3.2 Setting the scene: the general separation of banks and insurance companies comes to an end
Until 1990, the Dutch Central Bank was committed to the structure policy (structuurbeleid), this policy was
designed to facilitate sound banking practices and to enhance healthy competition in the industry. Part of this
structure policy, was that a ’Statement of No Objection’ had to be obtained by any bank which wanted to
merge with another organisation or which wanted to participate in the capital of another organisation for
more than 5%. In 1981, it was reaffirmed that entanglement of banks and insurance companies should be
prevented. Furthermore, it was decided that both banks and insurance companies should be prevented from
co-operating or merging with mortgage banks. Owing to problems with mortgage banks the restrictions on
participating in mortgage institutions were abolished in 1982, in order to strengthen shareholder equity of the
mortgage banks. According to Visser (1993) the problems with the mortgage banks provided a motive for
abolishing the restrictions on the participation of insurance companies in banks. Moreover, the common
market for financial services in the EC was about to be realised, and it was felt that in order to survive on
this common market, Dutch financial institutions had to be fortified. In fact, the past decade is characterised
by a general feeling that deregulation and liberalisation, i.e., letting the markets do the work, is the best
policy. Van Roij (1992: 52) gives two reasons for this deregulation tendency. First, regulation was no longer
proving effective, i.e., regulation was not achieving the aims it was meant to. In addition it had become
possible, due to the liberalisation of international capital markets, to avoid national regulation. Another way
of avoiding national law, was to adopt new organizational structures which were not subjected to the
requirements of law. Second, the insight became pervasive that detailed regulation of financial activities was
not efficient. Regulation can lead to rigid industry relations and decreased competitiveness. Regulation can
also hinder innovation in an industry. On January 1, 1990, the abolistion of the general separation between
banks and insurance companies took effect. In its annual report over 1989, DNB announced that the VSB
bank and the AMEV insurance group intended to merge as soon as DNB lifted the prohibition on mutual
participation of banks and insurance companies. A similar announcement was made regarding the intention
of RABO to increase its participation in the insurance company Interpolis (DNB 1990, p. 130-131). In its
1990 annual report, more mergers were announced by DNB, the most important being the merger of
Nationale Nederlanden and NMB Postbank Groep NV into the Internationale Nederlanden Groep NV (ING).
Furthermore, a number of former union banks and insurance companies merged into Reaal Groep NV (DNB
1991, p. 124-125).
8
8 Shleifer and Vishny (1994) provide additional evidence on the role of regulation in takeovers.
-11-3.3 A brief sketch of the problem: annual reporting by financial conglomerates
A general requirement of title 9 book 2 of the Civil Code pertains to the obligation to consolidate the
financial statements of all subsidiaries in a group and of all group members (article 406 paragraph 1).
However, when consolidation of a group member violates the insight requirement, the (consolidated) annual
report of such group member has to be included in the notes to the consolidated statement of the group. This
type of violation of the insight requirement is caused by differences in activities between the group member
and the group (art. 406 paragraph 3). In the literature pertaining to paragraph 3 of article 406, the case of
banks and insurance companies as members of a group is explicitly mentioned as an example of a situation
in which differences in activities may prevent consolidation (e.g., Burgert, Joosten and Timmermans, 1990:
9
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The question at hand is, whether financial conglomerates should consolidate both banking and insurance
activities. And furthermore, if consolidation is allowed, what should be done about the reduction in
information concerning individual activities. This reduction can be compensated by providing segmented
information in the balance sheet, the P&L or in the notes (see also, Van der Tas, 1993). Thus, if consolida-
tion is allowed, one also has to decide which additional information on the segments is necessary. Although,
one could doubt whether the consolidation of the banking part of a company primarily active in, for example,
the steel industry leads to insight in the financial position of such a company, it is not apparent that
consolidation of banks and insurance companies violates the insight requirement. The Minister of Justice and
the industry association, the NVB
10, insisted that violation of the insight requirement in case of financial
conglomerates should not be assumed too readily. Indeed, they argued that owing to the growing innovation
of financial products it will become more and more difficult (and even: useless) to distinguish between
banking and insurance products. Therefore, consolidation of the banking and insurance activities in the
annual report of the holding is not unquestionably in conflict with the insight requirement. The NVB puts it
even more strongly: financial conglomerates have to and wish to present themselves as indivisible entities.
Since no special rules as are given in chapter 14 and 15 of title 9 apply to financial conglomerates, these
companies are simply subjected to the fourth and seventh EC Directive (Explanatory Memorandum 22169
no. 3, p. 19). Consolidation of the activities of a financial conglomerate would, therefore, be desirable.
3.4 The legislative process part 1: the banking Directive incorporated
In a previous section of this paper, it was stated, that Dutch financial reporting regulation reflected the fourth
and seventh EC Directives. Article 1 paragraph 2 of the fourth Directive (PbEG L222 August 14, 1978)
stipulates that members of the EC are not compelled to subject banks, other financial institutions, and
insurance companies to the requirements of this Directive.
11 Notwithstanding this possibility in the EC
Directive, banks and insurance companies were not excluded from its operating range when both directives
were incorporated in Dutch companies law (i.e., title 9 book 2 Civil Code). However, some important
9 Burgert et al.’s example involved a bank or insurance company which was a member of a group
whose main activity was in the field of steel or shipping.
10 NVB stands for Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, Dutch Association of Banks.
11 The exemption of banks and insurance companies from the fourth Directive was temporary,
however, i.e., pending further coordination of these companies, the fourth Directive was not
necessarily applicable to them.
-12-exceptions were made for these firms, the foremost of these being on the degree of segmentation, the method
of valuation of investments, securities and foreign currency, and the possibility of nondisclosure of the
general banking risk reserve (articles 399 and 400 book 2 Civil Code).
On December 8, 1986 the Council of the European Community accepted the proposed Directive on annual
reporting by banks (hereafter, the banking Directive) (PbEG L372, December 31, 1986). It is interesting to
note that the DNB was the spokesman of the Dutch delegation at the EC’s meetings regarding the banking
Directive.
12 The DNB carried the point that consolidation of bank and insurance activities should not be
allowed, which was also the general opinion in the EC. It should be noted that this issue was barely a point
of discussion at the EC meetings pertaining to the banking Directive. This opinion resulted from the seventh
EC Directive, in particular article 14, which deals with consolidation. Article 14 stipulates that activities
outside the line of business should not be consolidated. This is particularly true when the activity is a bank
or insurance company. More generally, the DNB held that it was appropriate to allow only a limited degree
of freedom in reporting practice within a particular industry. General reporting requirements are relevant only
when they apply to a broad category of firms. Consequently, the DNB stressed the comparability argument
for reports of firms within an industry. Thus, in the EC discussion, the DNB agreed with the communis
opinio that insurance and bank activities could not be consolidated. This opinion was illustrated by rhetorical
questions such as, why would the EC issue a separate insurance and bank Directive if merger or consolida-
tion of both were to be possible? Indeed, why would there be separate supervision of banks and insurance
companies if these firms were to be able to merge?
In the EC meetings, the DNB additionally proposed including an optional paragraph in the Directive
regarding the exemption of the consolidation of sub-groups. Such an exemption would be issued if the parent
guaranteed the commitments of the exempted company. Furthermore, the parent had to be a credit institution.
(art. 43 paragraph 2b PbEG L372) Although the DNB proposed this optional paragraph, the Dutch Justice
Department chose not to use this option in its draft law.
Later in the process, when the banking Directive was transformed into a draft law by the Dutch Justice
Department, the DNB lifted its objections to the consolidation issue. The opposition of DNB to the
consolidation of bank and insurance activities was not sustainable as (economic) pressures rose. As a
supervisory agency, the DNB had more important issues to consider than reporting requirements. To disturb
the delicate balance of power between the DNB and the Dutch financial institutions on this minor point
seemed futile.
13 Also, there was some understanding within the central bank that these new financial
institutions would wish to show their financial strenghth in its totality. However, since these institutions were
likely to have important impact on the public they would have to disclose sufficient information, including
separate reports on both the banking and insurance segments. In addition to the DNB’s wish to have separate
reporting, there was another point that should be taken into consideration. The DNB strives for congruence
between the annual reports of banks and the maandstaten, monthly reports, which banks have to submit to
12 This was because financial reporting by banks is a responsibility of the Department of Finance.
There are close ties between the DNB and the Finance Department.
13 Interview with S. Wortmann (Department of Justice) on September 5, 1994.
-13-the DNB. Such congruence means that financial institutions have less costs in complying with reporting
requirements.
14 One could also contend that the DNB has an interest in controlling the knowledge gap
between the general public as a user of annual reports and itself with the additional information from the
monthly reports. Should this gap become too wide, the general public could point to the DNB in the case of
a bank failure, accusing it of inadequate supervision and not informing the public in time. However if the
gap is narrow, such accusations have less effect. Consequently, DNB favoured adequate disclosure by
financial institutions.
Thus, although the DNB agreed upon the consolidation issue, i.e., banks and insurance activities may
consolidate, it maintained its position that separate information should be provided in addition. The DNB had
not foreseen, at the time of the EC meetings, that financial conglomerates were to become an issue.
Therefore, at that time, the DNB considered the item of minor importance. However, by the time it became
clear that financial conglomerates were established, the DNB strongly advised additional disclosure in case of
consolidated reports on bank and insurance activities. Moreover, the DNB advised not to lay down any
further requirements in law until the EC formulated its own stipulations. The Justice Department did not
consider this advise to be in the interest of financial conglomerates since such EC requirements would
probably take a great deal of time to formulate and the outcome of the EC regulatory processes are not
readily predictable.
15 Therefore, they strived to have the whole matter laid down in law, before the EC
formulated its own views.
The banking Directive should have been incorporated into national law on December 31, 1990. However, the
implementation of the Directive in the form of a draft law took until June 1991 owing, as explained by the
ministers of Justice and Finance,
16 to the complexity of the matter and the intensive deliberations with the
parties involved (Explanatory Memorandum 22169 no. 3, p. 3).
17 According to Wortmann
18 of the Justice
Department, it is policy to encourage involvement of the companies to which a draft law pertains if the
proposed legislation deals with highly complex and technical matters as financial reporting. Indeed, the
department took initiative to contact inter alia AMEV, one of the constituting companies of Fortis to discuss
reporting by financial conglomerates. In their Explanatory Memorandum, the ministers stated that, with
regard to the consolidation of banks and insurance companies which are members of the same group, further
study was necessary. This in view of the fact, that on completing the banking Directive, it was not foreseen
14 Interview with R.E.K. Boezer (DNB) on September 29, 1994. Boezer does not agree with
Wortmann’s opinion that DNB made a trade-off between reporting issues and its supervising tasks.
Het carries the point that DNB deals separately on both issues with financial institutions.
15 Interview with S. Wortmann (Department of Justice) on September 5, 1994.
16 Two ministers were involved in this legislative process. First, Aad Kosto (PvdA, Labour Party),
Staatssecretaris (Deputy Minister) of Justice, defended the draft law in parliament, and was
spokesman on the issue. Second, Wim Kok (Labour Party) was involved as Minister of Finance.
17 When a minister submits a draft law to parliament, he adds an Explanatory Memorandum which
contains the history of the draft, the advise offered by representative organisations and an
explanation of the purpose and content of the law. The number after ’Explanatory Memorandum’
refers to the number of the draft law involved, in this case, 22169. The following number, preceded
by the abbrevation ’no.’ refers to the number of the document pertaining to a draft law, in this case,
document 3 which is the Explanatory Memorandum.
18 Interview on September 5, 1994.
-14-that banks and insurance companies would be able to form a financial conglomerate. Therefore, it was not
foreseen that consolidation of both activities would become an issue. No rules were laid down pertaining to
organisations with equally important banking and insurance activities. The ministers also planned to take the
forthcoming insurance Directive into account in formulating, at a later stage, their view on the consolidation
of activities within a financial conglomerate.
Despite these qualifications, the ministers voiced some of the preliminary opinions which were described in a
previous section. These views were also part of the Explanatory Memorandum. The ministers argued that
consolidation should not too readily be judged as conflicting with the insight requirement. In their opinion,
no other rules applied to the financial conglomerates with equal shares of banking and insurance activities
than those formulated in the fourth and seventh EC Directive. Kosto and Andriessen announced that a
workgroup had been formed consisting of industry members, which was to offer advice on the reporting
requirements of financial conglomerates.
In the mean time, the Council of the European Community accepted the Directive on (consolidated) annual
reporting by insurance companies (hereafter, the insurance Directive) on December 19, 1991 (PbEG L374
December 31, 1991). During the establishment of this insurance Directive, the insurance industry had
intensive contacts with the Dutch Justice Department. These contacts were used by the Department to discuss
the reporting requirements of financial conglomerates with industry members. In particular, the contacts with
Nationale Nederlanden, one of the constituting companies of ING, were important when the Department
formulated its opinion on the reporting matter.
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On January 31, 1992, the joint workgroup of industry members, representing both the NVB and the Verbond
van Verzekeraars (VvV) (Alliance of Insurance Companies) presented its advice, entitled ’Verslaggeving
financiele concerns’ (Financial conglomerate reporting). Four items were dealt with in this advisory paper,
namely, consolidation, segmentation, elimination and valuation. The paper included models for the
consolidated balance sheet and P&L of financial conglomerates. According to the workgroup, three kinds of
financial conglomerates are possible. The classification of these conglomerates is based on the composition
of the group and the position of the publishing company (group leader). When the publishing company is a
bank or a holding with primarily banking subsidiaries then the annual report should be based on reporting
rules and customs pertaining to banks. Insurance activities have to be mentioned in the consolidated
statements and in the notes to those statements. If the company publishing is an insurance company or a
holding with primarily insurance subsidiaries, the annual report will have to be published based on rules
similar to the previous case. If the company publishing is neither a bank nor an insurance company, then
special rules have to be designed and applied (NVB/VvV, 1992: 2-3). It is important to note that the
principal argument of the NVB/VvV workgroup read that financial conglomerates have to and wish to
present themselves as one unit (NVB/VvV, 1992: 2). It is, therefore, not desirable to require separate
reporting by the subsidiaries. The wish to be seen as one indivisible unit is also apparent in ING’s proposal
to construct a CAO, Collective Labour Agreement, for bancassurance companies, i.e., apart from the CAOs
of the banking and insurance industry (FD,
20 03-12-93). Indeed, this position was taken quite emphatically
19 Interview with W. Badon Ghijben and J.N.C. Kuijper (ING) on September 13, 1994.
20 FD is the (commonly used) abbreviation of Het Financieele Dagblad [The Financial Daily], the most
important financial paper in the Netherlands (cf. Zeff et al., 1992).
-15-by ING, mainly for strategic reasons, see section 3.6. Confining the presentation of the NVB/VvV-opinions
to the items that were disputed, one other item, the segmentation proposal, is of interest. In the NVB/VvV-
proposal on segment reporting, the workgroup stated that more detail should be provided in the notes to the
consolidated balance sheet and P&L statement to satisfy with the insight requirement and also to comply
with the requirements of the banking and insurance Directives. Insight into segment (activity) would have to
be given by splitting up the consolidated figures up to the level of earnings before taxes. However, there
should be no division of shareholder equity between the segments. Such a division is not in agreement with
the ’bedrijfseconomische’ (’business economic’ cf. Zeff et al. (1992)) characteristics of consolidated
reporting. In the opinion of ING, these business economic problems arise because group equity is the only
important figure for shareholders of the group. Those shareholders should not be concerned with the
allocation of equity over the activities. Reallocation of shareholder equity between the banking or insurance
part of the company does not necessarily have special consequences. Such reallocation would be fairly
arbitrary. Clients of a particular bank or insurance company within the group should be able to refer the
annual reports of that bank or insurance company to be assured of its solvency. Moreover, when segmenting
group equity, units which are legally part of the insurance company, could be allocated to the bank activities,
because of their character. However, this does not imply that the obligations of the unit to their clients are
guaranteed by the equity of the bank-part.
21 This statement by ING needs some qualification. By the time
of publication of the ING 1991 annual report, it was not clear whether seperate reports would be issued by
the NMB-Postbank or other subsiduaries of ING. Indeed, spokesmen at ING at the time of publication
contradicted each other on this matter (FD, 02-05-1992). Consequently, ING’s comment on the business-
economic argument is not valid, as this argument was used in 1991 at which time ING did not know whether
it was going to publish separate reports on the subsidiaries.
As stated above, the workgroup presented some models for reporting. With regard to companies with
primarily banking or insurance activities, the workgroup referred to the models of the DNB and the Verzeke-
ringskamer, though these models required the disclosure of additional information in order to reflect the
material insurance and banking activities, respectively. The model pertaining to financial conglomerates was,
however, new. In the discussion of the reaction of the companies involved an analysis was done of which
companies reflected this model in their annual report. It is important to note that the Justice Department
initiated and stimulated the joint NVB/VvV-advisory activities, and agreed with its general terms. During the
writing process there was contact between the Justice Department and the workgroup. However, within the
Justice Department it was felt that there was some disagreement between the members of the workgroup, in
particular between Fortis and ING, on the segmentation issue. Therefore, Wortmann, who was responsible
for the preperation of the draft law, began to formulate some stipulations regarding this segmentation issue
before the paper was published. It was in the interest of the Department of Justice and the industry to have a
shared line of conduct in financial reporting. If controversies on the reporting issue led to totally incompar-
able annual reports, the EC would have more reason to speed up its regulatory process and impose a
standard. Moreover, a shared line of conduct would make a favourable outcome of parliamentary deliber-
ations more likely.
21 Interview with Badon Ghijben and Kuijper (ING) on September 13, 1994.
-16-Parliament, i.e., the Second Chamber,
22 waited until the publication of the industry advisory paper before
starting its ’preparatory investigation’ of the draft law in a legislative committee in the first quarter of 1992.
In their Provisional Report, the members of the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) stated that they were
somewhat disappointed by the industry advice. Indeed, the CDA spokesman, Thomas Vreugdenhil MP, stated
that this advice was clearly a compromise. Vreugdenhil implied that there clearly must have been significant
controversy on this issue between the members of the workgroup. Logrolling had probably taken place,
giving ING’s opinion priority on this issue. Consequently, the advice was not considered very important by
Vreugdenhil.
23
In the CDA’s opinion, one of the driving forces behind the banking Directive was the comparability concept.
Leaving out equity as irrelevant was, according to the CDA, typical of the lack of comparability between
financial conglomerates and banks and insurance companies that would result from implementing this advice.
The CDA’s demand was that separate consolidated annual reports of both the banking and insurance group
should be provided in addition to the annual report of the whole conglomerate (Provisional Report, 22169 no.
4: 1-2). Notable was the CDA’s stress on the comparability argument, which is conflicts with the leading
principle of Dutch financial reporting regulation, insight. One could question whether a chapter on bank
reporting based on comparability would fit in the title 9 system of the Civil Code which is based on
’insight’. Again, it was Vreugdenhil who stressed comparability. As a former partner of the international firm
of Price Waterhouse, he was familiar with Anglo-Saxon norms in standard setting, with its emphasis on
comparability. Furthermore, Vreugdenhil attached a great deal of value to the interests of investors, which
would be served by comparability. Indeed, a large investment firm called Vreugdenhil’s attention to the need
for the comparability of annual reports. Although Vreugdenhil visited several financial conglomerates,
24 it
was the investor’s interests which had influenced him most profoundly.
At this stage of the regulatory process only the Christian Democrats made remarks regarding the financial
conglomerates. The ministers, Kosto and Kok, answered the legislative committee in a Memorandum of
Reply (22169 no. 5: 2-3). They again expressed their opinion that financial conglomerate reporting is not
subject to the rules pertaining to banks or insurance companies. In the present situation, without any
guidance by existing rules abroad or in the Netherlands, the initiative of the NVB/VvV should be appreciated
as it was the first attempt at mapping the problems and furnishing some solutions. With regard to the
irrelevance of equity the segmentation, the ministers stated that the existence of financial conglomerates was
a relatively new development. The special characteristics of financial conglomerates, i.e., the entanglement of
both banking and insurance activities, should be expressed in their annual report. In particular, the consoli-
dated annual report of the whole economic entity, the financial conglomerate, is of importance. In view of
the special properties of banks and insurance companies, and their prominent position in society, financial
conglomerates cannot suffice with this consolidated information. Owing to the separation of banks and
insurers in the past, it is possible, at present, to provide information about the separate activities. The
question, according to Kosto and Kok, is in which fashion the additional information should be offered and
what level of insight is sufficient. The ministers suggested that insight should be offered into both activities
22 Parliament consists of two Chambers of which the Second Chamber is the politically more
important.
23 Interview with Th. O. Vreugdenhil on August 17, 1994.
24 Vreugdenhil visited ABN-AMRO, ING, RABO, and Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland.
-17-in accordance with the discerned Directives. This proposal was formalised in a Memorandum of Alterations
(Nota van wijziging, 22169 no. 6: 1) pertaining to article 406, to which three new paragraphs were added of
which paragraph 4 and 5 are relevant to the issue at hand. The ministers argued that their proposal was in
line with the NVB/VvV advise. It should be noted that the Minister of Justice initially did not intend to set
down these requirements in law. The initial plan was to let the NVB/VvV suggestions be the (informal)
standard, without any legislative backing. However, owing to political pressures (Vreugdenhil) and the
explicit wish of the DNB for there to be legislative requirements on this issue, the new paragraphs of 406
were implemented.
25 In hindsight, both the Department of Justice and ING, as a major contributor to the
NVB/VvV advisory paper, concluded that the advice was of little relevance to the resulting regulation, in
contrast with ex ante expectations. One of the most important statements in their Memorandum of Reply was
that the ministers did not wish to commit themselves to the way in which insight in both activities should be
provided. They insisted that there would be an ongoing entanglement of both activities. The requirement of
separate consolidated annual reports could lead, in due time, to statements which do not offer a reliable
picture of the financial situation per segment, owing to the large number of arbitrary allocations, and the
unravelling of what is in fact an indivisible economic entity. However, when financial conglomerates feel
that the demanded insight is best provided by separate annual reports, they would be free to issue such
reports.
In summary, because of the growing impossibility of distinguishing between banking and insurance products
and activities the ministers proposed that insight, as a general and quite broad requirement, should be
provided into the whole entity as well as both activities. Managerial discretion would determine the most
adequate way of offering such insight. This ministerial proposal was in line with the joint-industry advice.
At this stage of the policy process, there was consensus about consolidating banking and insurance activities
into one annual report. Difference of opinion between the ministers and industry, on the one hand, and the
CDA, on the other, existed on the subject of the format by which insight into the discerned activities should
be offered.
The final report of the legislative committee emphasised this difference of opinion. The CDA members
reacted to the ministers’ Memorandum of Reply by stating, that although the entanglement of banking and
insurance activities might theoretically prevent the separation of both activities in separate reports, in
practice, management of financial conglomerates would still want to know whether a certain activity is
profitable or efficient. In other words, it is unlikely that the seperation of both activities is impossible, owing
to the need of a company’s managerial control. The CDA also mentioned to the position of the supervising
institutions. These institutions would also require segmented equity information. The CDA argued that the
ministers’ noncommitment to the way in which insight in separate activities should be given, was in conflict
with the EC Directive and with the proposed changes of article 406, which from this perspective implied that
disclosure of the equity of the banking segment was necessary. It is interesting to note that the CDA referred
to the Fortis annual report as an example of the possibility for disclosing the banking segment’s equity.
Indeed, according to Vreugdenhil, the Fortis report convinced the CDA that it was possible to provide insight
25 Interview with Wortmann (Department of Justice), on September 5, 1994 and with Boezer (DNB)
on September 29, 1994. The DNB not only wished to have legal reporting requirements, they also
were in favour of only limited options open in reporting to the companies involved. Limiting
freedom in reporting would facilitate comparability, which is one of the prime goals of the DNB.
-18-into both activities, separately. Moreover, this conviction was strengthened in a conversation with Y. van der
Schaaf-Visser, head of Group Accounting at Fortis, based on an article by van der Schaaf in FEM, a
financial biweekly. It is interesting to note that ING also contended that there were only a few technical
obstacles in separate reporting.
26 Thus, although the ministers accentuated accounting problems with
separate reporting, the companies involved readily admitted that such problems were not the major issue.
In the same report (Final Report 22169 no. 7: 2), the members of the Labour Party (PvdA) also questioned
the noncommitment of the ministers with regard to the manner in which insight should be given.
The ministers, thereupon, responded in a Memorandum in account of the final report (Nota naar aanleiding
van het Eindverslag 22169 no. 8). They stated that, in their opinion, it would not be possible to act in
conflict with the EC Directives since neither the banking nor the insurance Directive made any provisions
regarding mixed financial companies. The ministers argued, furthermore, that although it was indeed
uncertain whether banking and insurance activities would become so entwined that reporting on separate
activities would become arbitrary, both management and supervising institutions would have sufficient
instruments to obtain necessary insight into the financial position, regardless.
27 Moreover, the ministers
found the CDA members to be correct that as a result of art. 406 paragraph 4 and 5, the equity of both
banking and insurance activities would have to be disclosed in some fashion in the segmentation. Further-
more, the minister announced that advice had been asked of the Council on Annual Reporting regarding the
way in which insight should be provided (i.e., the concrete elaboration of paragraph 4 and 5 of art. 406).
28
This request for advice should be seen as a diversionary manoeuvre, the intention of which was to get the
proposed article 406 implemented without further changes.
29 One should note that this art. 406 left
considerable freedom to the financial conglomerates regarding their reporting. Indeed, it was formulated in
such a way that it suited both ING and Fortis, the parties which had the most contrasting opinions.
This reply of the ministers was the somewhat sudden (provisional) end to the problem. The proposed article
406 was enacted without further changes and the matter was not a point of discussion on the floor of the
Second Chamber (Proceedings Handelingen TK 20-1481). The First Chamber did not have any comments on
the issue of financial conglomerates.
3.5 The legislative process part 2: the insurance Directive incorporated
This was not the end of the story, however. On December 19, 1991, the Council of the European Commun-
ity accepted the proposed Directive regarding the (consolidated) annual reports of insurance companies
(PbEG L374 December 31, 1991). The draft law to incorporate the Directive into Dutch law was submitted
to Parliament on November 5, 1992. In the Explanatory Memorandum (22896 no. 3: 23) Kosto and Kok
stated that financial conglomerates, i.e., mixed financial companies with equal shares in banking and
26 Interview with Badon Ghijben and Kuijper (ING) on September 13, 1994.
27 Indeed, the Justice Department itself regarded the entanglement argument to be weak. Nonetheless,
it was considered convenient in parliamentary discussions.
28 The Council on Annual Reporting established thereupon a workgroup, whose members were: J. van
der Plas (Moret, Ernst and Young, auditor of ING), J. Buitendijk (ING), A.F.M. van Klaren
(CNV/FNV -union-), O.L.A.M. Spaan (ABN/AMRO), M.H.Th. Steunebrink (NIVRA -auditor-),
Prof. F. van der Wel (auditor/academic) (RJ, 1993: 4).
29 Interview with Wortmann (Department of Justice), on September 5, 1994.
-19-insurance activities, should report in accordance with paragraph 4 and 5 of article 406.
In its report (Report, 22896 no.5: 1) the CDA members of the legislative committee once again stressed the
comparability concept. They argued that it was desirable that the insight of the general public into the
financial position of insurance companies be enlarged. Apparently, in the CDA’s opinion, comparability is a
manner of increasing insight into the financial position of a firm, in the CDA’s opinion. With regard to the
financial conglomerates, the CDA favoured an organisational structure with a topholding and two subhol-
dings which supervised the banking and insurance activities, respectively. Each holding should publish a
consolidated annual report, so that the financial position of the whole conglomerate as well as its constituting
parts would become visible. The CDA members indicated that they were willing to lay down such a structure
in law. The idea behind this proposal was that such an organisational structure would make life easier (for
the investor). Moreover, the supervising institutions, would be provided with a clear distinction between
banks and insurance companies.
30
Labour Party members (Report, 22896 no.5: 2) also emphasised the comparability of the annual reports of
insurers. These members joined the CDA in their opinion that insight into financial conglomerates should be
enlarged by laying down requirements to disclose banking and insurance activities. Such requirements would
also benefit the supervisors, in this case the DNB and the Verzekeringskamer.
The minister replied (Memorandum to Report, 22896 no. 6: 2) that, in accordance with article 406, financial
conglomerates have to disclose in their notes dealing with the principal consolidation, behoorlijk wat, i.e.,
substantial, data pertaining to the separate activities. These stipulations were incorporated in law because it
was feared that without such requirements a top holding company could publish just one consolidated annual
report without providing any insight into the separate activities.
Apparently, the CDA members of the committee were not satisfied with this answer. They did not consider
the disclosure of substantial amount of data in the notes on the consolidation of the top-holding to be
sufficient. They once again suggested that requiring two consolidated annual reports, one for each activity
(Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg Report on written deliberations, 22896 no. 8: 2). The minister repeated
his view that consolidation of both activities in the annual report of the top holding was in line with the
European Directive regarding consolidation (Directive no. 7) and was, in view of the ongoing entanglement
of the aforementioned activities, justifiable with regard to the required insight. Therefore, according to the
minister, it was stipulated in article 406 that consolidation is allowed, but that separate information about
bank and insurance activities was required, in accordance with the EC Directives regarding both activities.
This answer was still not satisfactory to the PvdA and CDA, and the MP’s Vreugdenhil (CDA) and
Vermeend (PvdA) submitted an amendment to article 406 in which the separation of information on banking
and insurance activities was laid down. Formally, a new paragraph 6 was added to article 406, which
demanded the separation of information about the balance sheet, in accordance with the form requirements of
the EC Directives. The separation should at any rate provide insight into the equity of the bank and
insurance activities, respectively. Through this amendment, the noncommitment of the ministers regarding the
manner in which insight should be given, was put aside. Instead of the relative freedom in the presentation
of data that the ministers (and industry) advocated, the framework and requirements of both EC Directives
were imposed. Information pertaining to separate activities within the banks or insurance companies was not
required. This amendment was then taken up by the minister who submitted a Second Modificatory
Memorandum (22896 no. 11) containing the stipulations of the amendment. The draft law was subsequently
30 Interview with Th. O. Vreugdenhil.
-20-accepted by parliament. It was the intention of Vreugdenhil to defend his amendment on the floor of the
Second Chamber. Kosto was advised to resist the amendment, although the Justice Department did not
considered it probable that the amendment would be withdrawn. Pure coincendence hindered a plenary
treatment in the Second Chamber. The plenary treatment of the draft was scheduled for June 30, 1993. On
that day, however, the chairman of the Second Chamber, Deetman, decided to cancel the treatment of the
draft. This cancellation caused some distress to the Justice Department, because the law was to be
implemented within six months and still had to be submitted to and debated in the First Chamber. Therefore,
the Justice Department, taking into consideration that the Vreugdenhil/Vermeend amendment had a majority
in the Second Chamber and that, therefore, the probability of withdrawal was nil, took up the amendment in
exchange for Vreugdenhil’s renouncement of deliberation on the floor of the Chamber.
31 The First Chamber
did not make any comments on the proposal. A question that remained to be answered, is what triggered
Vreugdenhil and Vermeend’s amendment, in which the form in which insight should be provided was laid
down, including the requirement pertaining to the segmentation of shareholder equity. Two factors seemed to
have played a role. First, a high ranking officer of ING, Badon Ghijben, maintained in a conversation with
Vreugdenhil that article 406, in the form that resulted after draft law 22169 was accepted, did not compel
financial conglomerates to report separately on banking and insurance activities in accordance with the form
requirements of the EC Directive nor did it compel these companies to segment shareholder equity. Indeed,
the 1992 ING annual report did not report on the segments at the level of shareholder equity. Second, Kosto
announced in the parliamentary treatment of the bank draft, that he would ask the advice of the Council on
Annual Reporting on the matter of the application of article 406 in the case of annual reporting by
bank/assurance companies (financial conglomerates). A source from within the Council stated informally to
Vreugdenhil that the Council was not able to reach agreement on this advice. The workgroup, instated by the
Council, advised not to disclose segmentation information on shareholder equity, in line with ING’s
position.
32 The advice of the Council’s workgroup met with resistance within the Council. In particular, the
auditors and users delegation objected to the implications of the advice. They were in favour of disclosure.
Vreugdenhil observed that ING again was the obstructing party in the failure to reach an agreement.
33 In
Vreugdenhil’s opinion ING would have considerable influence on the employers’ delegation in the Council
on Annual Reporting, as it was a large contributor to the funds of the Federation of Dutch Industries (VNO).
In conclusion, the obstruction of the implementation of article 406 by ING led to the Vreugdenhil/Vermeend-
amendment.
3.6 Field reactions: the companies involved
In Section 3.2, it was described how starting in 1990 insurance companies and banks were allowed to merge.
This implies that the companies involved in this bancassurance case, are relatively new in their present form.
In 1992, twelve financial conglomerates were registered in the Netherlands (Van der Tas 1993). Of these
twelve companies, five were established in 1992, which means that only seven financial conglomerates
existed in 1991. At least three financial conglomerates were formed in 1990, namely Fortis (combination of
31 Interview with Wortmann (Justice Department) on September 5, 1994.
32 Interview with Badon Ghijben and Kuijper (ING), on September 13, 1994.
33 Indeed, another high ranking ING officer was a member of the workgroup which prepared the
advice, namely J. Buitendijk.
-21-AMEV, AG and VSB), RABO (bank with insurance company Interpolis) and Reaal (combination of Reaal
Verzekering, Centrale Volksbank and Hollandse Koopmansbank NV). This group was enlarged in 1991
when ABN and AMRO merged into ABN-AMRO. Aegon NV (insurance company with Bank Van Haften
Labouchere and FGH Bank), Internationale Nederlanden Groep (ING, a merger of Nationale Nederlanden
and NMB Postbank), Levob (insurance company with OV Bank NV) were also established in 1991. The
1991 annual report will be the one at the center of attention, because no regulation had yet been imple-
mented, so this report is the most likely to reflect the preferences of the companies involved. Using ’share in
turnover’ as a classification measurement, Van der Tas (1993) proposed the following classification of the
companies mentioned:
Insurance group with bank activities: Aegon, Fortis and Levob.
Bank group with insurance activities: ABN-AMRO and RABO.
Mixed financial company: ING and Reaal.
In the 1991 annual report of all seven companies both banking and insurance activities were consolidated.
Van der Tas (1993) shows that ING and Reaal copied the proposals (model) of the NVB/VvV workgroup for
both the balance sheet and the P&L. ING adhered more closely to the proposal than Reaal. Remarkable is
the Fortis annual report which also applied the mixed financial company format, although it was not truly a
mixed financial company. The annual report of Fortis had some other features worth mentioning, these are
discussed below (see also FD, 4-2-1992). To illustrate the relative importance of the seven companies
mentioned some selected financial data are presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 reflects the segmented
information provided by the companies.
The observation that ABN-AMRO does not provide any separate reporting may be explained by the fact that
the insurance activities of ABN-AMRO are marginal, so that the contribution of insurance activities to the
consolidated result may not be material. Table 3.2 facilitates the conclusion that Fortis discloses the most
information. Fortis holds a somewhat special position in this case, since it is a transnational merger, being
the result of the merger between the Dutch VSB/AMEV and the Belgian AG. The choice for separate
reporting of bank and insurance activities may be attributed to the special structure of Fortis, i.e. Fortis has
two parents, AG Group and N.V. AMEV, which themselves are not part of Fortis. Both parents have a 50%
interest in Fortis, via a 50% interest in AG 1824 and AMEV/VSB 1990. The AG Group participates in
AMEV/VSB 1990 by means of its 94%-subsidiary AG 1990 N.V. and the 100%-subsiduary of the latter, AG
1990 (Netherlands), in which they perform their operational activities.
One important question remains to be answered, and that is why was it that ING was the foremost opposent
to the requirements of (the draft) law? In the observation of Vreugdenhil MP, the reason was that of the
companies constituting the ING, namely, NMB-Postbank and Nationale Nederlanden, NMB-Postbank had the
weaker shareholder equity position. In the merger process, significant transfers of equity funds had taken
place to strengthen the NMB-Postbank’s equity position. NMB-Postbank itself was established as a result of
a merger between NMB and Postbank. It was NMB which had previously committed itself to an agressive
market policy which inherently meant a high risk. This high risk had had its effects on NMB’s shareholder
equity. Vreugdenhil based his observation on an internal source within ING. Table 3.3 provides the equity
development of ING and NMB-Postbank in the relevant years.
ING denied that equity transfers were the reason for their rejection. Instead, they stated that they had wished
-22-to present themselves as one indivisible unit. This wish had a strategic origin. Some (financial) analysts had
doubted the feasability of financial conglomerates (Keiser, 1993; FD, 6-08-1993; Barkema, Douma and
Steins Bisschop, 1992). ING therefore, did not wish to emphasise the fact that it was the result of a merger
between two fields which previously where thought to be impossible to unite. In a way separate reporting
would signal to investors that the critics were right, and that even ING was not certain of its own success.
34
While ING did not favour the segmentation proposal, in the end it acknowledged that it was very likely that
this proposal would become law. At that time, ING changed its strategy; as was noted before, ING’s finance
officer, Badon Ghijben had a conversation with Vreugdenhil in April 1993. In this discussion, Badon
Ghijben tried to convince Vreugdenhil that segmentation of shareholder equity would not provide useful
additional information to the users. When this argument failed Badon Ghijben put forward another aspect of
the insurance draft which was considered undesirable by the insurance-industry. Under the draft law (22896),
it was not permitted not to depreciate real estate which was used by the company itself [Explanatory
Memorandum 22896, no 1-2: 9). Although there had been intensive discussions between the Justice
Department and industry on this point, the department had not given in
35. In a letter to the Chamber’s
legislative committee, the Verbond van Verzekeraars had already asked the committee to amend this point.
Badon Ghijben now suggested to Vreugdenhil amending the draft in accordance with the wishes of the
industry. This could then be seen as a trade-off between the segmentation and the depreciation-issue.
36
3.7 Field reactions: auditor involvement
The market for audit services in financial conglomerates is characterised by a duopoly. Two audit firms
divide the market between themselves: Moret, Ernst & Young (MEY) and KPMG Klynveld. The market is
not stable, however. KPMG has lost some ground to MEY in recent years. Table 3.4 provides more detail of
market developments.
Analysis of the opinions of the auditors does not provide much insight into their position with regard to the
question at hand, that of separate reporting. Most published statements are merely explications of the require-
ments of law (e.g., MEY, 1990; KPMGa/b, 1993; De Haan, 1993a, 1993b). However, in presenting the MEY
annual report 1991, Prof. A. Bindenga, MEY vice chairman of the board of MEY, stated that it was the
opinion of MEY that separate reporting was required for those financial conglomerates which had equal
shares of bank and insurance activities. Bindenga proposed three-column reporting, which would reflect the
specific capital structure and interest margin of the banking activities and would also provide insight into the
ratio between investments and long-term obligations. Finally, a consolidated statement would provide insight
into the total financial position and results (FD, 25-03-92). This statement by Bindenga is interesting.
Primarily, because it seems that the clients of MEY do not share Bindenga’s opinion. In their annual reports,
separate reporting is only present to a very modest degree. It is also of importance because of the timing.
Bindenga made his statement after the joint NVB/VvV advice was published, but before Parliament
discussed the draft law. Moreover, it should be noticed that Bindenga’s ideas contrasted with the proposals
made by NVB/VvV. Although remarkable, Bindenga’s views did not seem to have an important impact on
34 Interview with Badon Ghijben and Kuijper (ING), September 13, 1994.
35 According to ING, Prof. Van Hulle, responsible for reporting issues in the EC, agreed with ING and
the insurance industry on this point. (Interview with Badon Ghijben)
36 Interview with Vreugdenhil on August 17, 1994 and with Badon Ghijben on September 13, 1994.
-23-the political process, since Vreugdenhil was not aware of Bindenga’s statement. This does not imply that
Bindenga’s statement went by unnoticed. The Justice Department was somewhat concerned that one of the
largest auditing firms in the country, appeared to take a position which clearly diverged from the Depart-
ment’s policy. A civil servant at the Justice Department contacted MEY, in order to find out whether this
was indeed an official position taken by the firm regarding this issue. MEY made it clear that there was no
such position and that Bindenga’s statement reflected only his personal views.
37 That Bindenga’s statement
did nogo by unnoticed, is also clear in the reaction of ING-official, Badon Ghijben. ING was audited as is
shown in Table 3.3, by MEY. The responsible auditor at MEY, Van de Brande, held quite a different
opinion on the issue than Bindenga. Indeed, Van de Brande was one of the people who supported the idea
that ING should present itself as one indivisible unity. Badon Ghijben stated in an interview that he was not
pleased with the statements by Bindenga. He felt Bindenga’s statement to be a result of a lack of knowledge
on the issue.
One other auditor’s opinion is worth noticing. Prof. F. van der Wel, a partner aat TRN, asserted on several
occasions that financial conglomerates should report banking and insurance activities separately (Van der
Wel, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). TRN however, does not perform any audit services for the financial conglomer-
ates, so that Van der Wel’s statements can be considered as opinions of an academic more than of an
auditor. Van der Wel played another role, which seems to conflict with his statements in writing. The
Council on Annual Reporting’s workgroup, which he chaired, proposed not to disclose information on
segments’ shareholder equity.
3.8 Field reactions: the financial press
The reactions of the financial press on financial conglomerates and their reporting ranged from critical to
outright hostile. Editorial comments on the developments of reporting by financial conglomerates appeared in
The Financial Daily and FEM (Financial and Economic Magazine), a financial biweekly. Some headlines are
presented here to give an impression of the attitude of the press with regard to financial conglomerates.
’Annual report ING offers even less than ABN-AMRO’s.’ (Jaarverslag ING biedt nog minder dan ABN
AMRO) (FD, 02-05-1992) ’Hymn of praise on bancassurance is silenced.’ (Loflied op verzekerbanken
verstilt) (FD, 13-11-1992). ’Financial conglomerates offer farrago.’ (Financiële concerns maken ratjetoe)
(FEM, 13-06-1992) ’Insurers, more realism please!’ (Verzekeraars, meer realisme graag!) (Hers, 1993)
’Insurance lobby scores.’ (Verzekeringslobby scoort) (Hers, 1993) ’Down with All Finanz!’ (Weg met All
Finanz!) (Keiser, 1993).
The general line in the press comments is that important companies as banks and insurers should provide
enough information for the reader of annual reports to obtain a good insight into the affairs of the company
(see, for example, FD, 02-05-1992 and FD, 13-11-1992). In particulary the (alleged) concentration of power
in financial conglomerates is of concern to the financial press. It is stated that more disclosure and a better
annual report could contribute to the insight into the affairs of financial conglomerates. Moreover, the
concentration of power should lead to increased supervision by the DNB and the Verzekeringskamer.
FEM stressed furthermore the comparability of the reports of financial conglomerates with these of other
companies. Their opinion was that the exception Dutch law makes for insurance companies and banks
pertaining to their reporting requirements should be abolished in order to make comparisons possible and in
order to obtain ’commercieel realisme’ (commercial realism) in their annual reports (e.g., Hers, 03-05-1993).
37 Interview with Wortmann (Department of Justice), on September 5, 1994.
-24-CDA MP Vreugdenhil indicated that he used the articles in FEM in forming his opinion on the matter at
hand. Although FEM seems to have an important signalling function in the political process, Vreugdenhil
expressed annoyance with the negative and sometimes hostile tone in the articles. This annoyance was shared
by Wortmann at the Department of Justice.
4. Discussion and analysis of results
In this section, the predictions of pluralist theory as described in Section 2 will be compared with the result
of the case study from the preceding section. The discussion will start with the prediction of the equilibrium,
i.e., the prediction of the result of the regulation process, and the point of view it will concur with. Further-
more, the prediction regarding the behaviour of the players involved will be discussed. If pluralist theory
lacks explanatory power (on some issues), the alternative theories of Section 2 (elite, Marxist and corporatist)
will be applied to explain behaviour.
Pluralism offers a picture of the regulatory process in which unequally powerful interest groups, among
which politicians and bureaucrats, compete for favours. It is argued that the degree of influence of the
competing interest groups depends on their resources. Although politicians compete for votes, they will not
necessarily favour majorities in their regulation. The legislatures take from those who are least capable of
resisting the demands for wealth transfers and give to those who are best organised for pressing their
demands (McCormick and Tollison, 1981). In Section 2, the prediction was formulated that since preparers
are wealthier than consumers, the preparers’ lobby efforts will be more ardent. Furthermore, their lobbying
was expected to result from existing organisational forms, such as industry associations, owing to cost-
sharing problems and start-up costs.
Indeed, empirical evidence in this case substantiates the predictions of pluralism. It was primarily the
preparers who lobbied. They had intensive contacts with the Justice Department in the drafting phase of both
laws, and before that they were involved in European discussions pertaining to the discerned directives. Also,
they contacted Thomas Vreugdenhil MP, trying to convice him of their point of view. Moreover, an
important part of the lobbying was performed within the structure of a joint initiative of the two industry
associations involved, the NVB and VvV. Although one could argue whether this structure is an established
lobbying forum, it seems reasonable to suggest that this joint initiative is not an ad hoc group. The joint
NVB/VvV workgroup was supplied secretarial support by NVB. The workgroup was formed by members of
both industry associations.
The group of companies involved is not homogeneous as was pointed out in Section 3. ING is by far the
most important financial conglomerate (with equal shares of bank and insurance activities). Fortis has some
importance, as well. It was suggested that large companies would carry the burden of lobbying efforts owing
to the free rider problem. Indeed, ING appeared to be the most active lobbying party. Even Fortis, which
was certainly involved in the process, for example, in its contacts with the Justice Department and in the
formulation of the NVB/VvV advice, did not seem to have played an active part. Indeed, the contacts with
the Justice Department were the result of initiatives on the part of the department itself. Therefore, the
prediction that large companies, with signifant interests in the regulatory process, will perform the lobbying
activities, is corroborated. We have seen that there has been both collective and individual action on the
financial conglomerates’ issue. Collective action took place in the environment of the industry associations,
thereby providing sufficient warranty against free riding. Although some companies seem to have been
dominant in these collective actions, all of the important companies provided input. However, since the
-25-expected benefits were apparently large enough, individual influence actions were undertaken by ING.
Lobbying also seems to have penetrated the standard setting body, the Council on Annual Reporting. In the
workgroup of this Council, ING’s position was supported. Afterwards, in deliberations on the floor of the
Council, the representatives of the employers’ organisations, also readily supported ING’s position.
Comparing the 1991-annual reports of the financial conglomerates with the NVB/VvV-proposal, it appeared
that ING’s annual report concurred best with this proposal. Therefore, and in light of the result of the
interviews, it seems reasonable to suggest that logrolling took place in favour of ING’s preferences. The
conclusion seems all the more legitimate because Fortis, the other major player in the field, had a completely
different disclosure preference.
Some predictions were also formulated regarding the lobbying methods that would be applied. It was
suggested that the choice between lobbying methods would be based on cost-effectiveness, the importance of
the issue, the question whether a certain position was more or less disputed, and the cultural and historical
background of the parties involved. To start with the last element, one of the respondents pointed out that it
was unlikely that captains of industry would participate in demonstrations. Indeed, most lobbying occurred
through some form of information transfer. It is interesting to note that the government itself explicitly
solicited such information transfer (NVB/VvV-advice). Not only did the industry transfer information by
publishing an advice, it also participated in the exchange of views while the new legislation was being
debated. With regard to the timing of lobbying, the prediction was that the effective lobbying would occur as
early in the process as possible. Indeed, as one respondent observed, lobbying was likely to be most
successful when it took place even before a civil servant sets pencil to paper for the first time to write a
proposal. However, there were some related issues regarding financial conglomerates that lead to the
conclusion that Amershi’s et al. [1982] warning has to be taken serious in this case. For example, ING and
the insurance industry fiercely objected to the proposed rule regarding the depreciation of real estate in own
use. This rule was eventually traded against the equity segmentation issue. The DNB on the other hand, was
initially given a large role in the formulation of reporting requirements for banks. The Second Chamber
opposed the delegation of rule-making power to a private institution, such as the DNB. This was a surprise
to the DNB, since it was not informed by the Justice Department of the pending rejection by the Chamber of
the proposed draft.
38 It is not unlikely that this experience influenced the segmentation issue. In particular,
it should be considered that Vreugdenhil had received internal information from the banking industry stating
they were not in favour of a more pronounced role for the DNB in the standard-setting process.
39
Finally, predictions were formulated regarding the content of the preparers’ preferences. Based on Mian and
Smith’s (1990a) finding it was argued that interdependence was a major factor in explaining consolidation
38 Interview with Boezer (DNB) on September 29, 1994.
39 Interview with Vreugdenhil (CDA) on August 17, 1994. The statement by Vreugdenhil reveals a
conflict between the official statements of banks regarding the DNB’s standard-setting efforts and
their ’hidden agenda’. According to Boezer at the DNB, the DNB issued reporting requirements in
order to comply with an explicit request made by the banks. Wortmann indicated that these
reporting requirements facilitated comparable annual reports and a shared line of conduct, thereby
shielding the banking industry from excessive (European) regulation. As Vreugdenhil pointed out,
part of this conflict could be explained by the power the DNB possessed in the Dutch financial
system. Another explanation could be that the banks feared that the delicate balance of power
between regulator (DNB) and regulees (industry) would be disturbed, by further increasing DNB
tasks.
-26-and disclosure preferences. Management has incentives to disclose information, in order to reduce agency
costs. However, these incentives may be countervailed by the costs of providing valuable information to
competitors, and by the costs of information production. As Consolidation, as a rule, leads to less disclosure,
one may expect that consolidation will, therefore, be preferred by preparers (if agency cost reduction is
sufficiently small). Furthermore, increased interdependence strengthens the preference for consolidation. The
more a company wishes to accentuate the fact that it is an economic entity, the stronger the drive will be for
consolidation. The findings of the case suggest that these predictions were fairly accurate. Although the
financial conglomerates disclosed quite a lot of information, there was a clear borderline regarding this
disclosure: the segmentation of shareholder equity was strongly opposed. This is, in fact, a wish for
consolidation that can be attributed to the economic-entity argument. ING repeatedly stated that it wished to
show itself to be a whole indivisible unit. A comparable argument was made in the NVB/VvV-advice. The
interdependence within financial conglomerates are substantiated by the increasing resemblance between
financial services or products (which cannot exclusively be categorised as either bank or insurance product).
Moreover, financial conglomerates use the same distribution channels to deliver their services to customers.
Also, information production costs enhance interdependence, as was argued in Section 2.
With regard to the lobby efforts of users and their position in the disclosure debate, the following hypotheses
were drawn. First, it was stated that users were likely to prefer no consolidations or, when consolidation was
allowed, would prefer additional, segmented information. Compared to the preparers of financial statements,
users seemed to have less resources at their disposal. Therefore, it was hypothesised that users were unlikely
to lobby (intensively). However, in the case at hand, there was a user with substantial resources, i.e., the
large investment firm that called Vreugdenhil’s attention to the position of the users of annual reports of
financial conglomerates. Consequently, the substantial influence of this user is completely explicible within
pluralist theory. Apparently, this user committed more resources to the cause of financial conglomerates’
reporting than the industry did. The users were important in another aspect of the political process. Both the
users’ and auditors’ delegation in the Council on Annual Reporting were opposed to the proposals of the
Council’s workgroup which held, grosso modo, the ING policy. Subsequently, the Council could not reach a
decision and Vreugdenhil had the opportunity to submit his amendment.
In the end, the users seem to have won the segmentation issue. It is their choice which is reflected in
equilibrium.
In Section 2, a few conflicting incentives were identified regarding the position of auditors. In general, the
theoretical prediction appeared to be that auditors favour increased consolidation in connection with separate
reports on the segments. This prediction was substantiated by two elements: first, audit fees are likely to rise
with the complexity of auditing activities: when auditors have to certify not only the consolidated statements
but also the separate statements, more items become material and have to be looked into; second, the Haring-
Puro hypothesis reads that auditors do not support their clients on disclosure matters.
Although a superficial glance at the case evidence might suggest that these hypotheses were confirmed, more
careful examination inevitably leads to the conclusion that, in this case, auditors did support their clients.
Bindenga’s statement clashed with his clients’ interest. However, Bindenga was not supported by other
partners at Moret, Ernst and Young. Indeed, the MEY auditor who was most involved in financial
conglomerates’ reporting, Van de Brande, supported ING’s position completely. Bindenga’s statement was
referred to as an internal communications error.
-27-The conclusion may be drawn that pluralist theory provides fairly accurate predictions in the case of bank
assurance in the Netherlands. However, this observation requires some qualification. Several respondents
remarked that although a reporting issue may be relevant and important to accountants and researchers, in the
every day reality of doing business in the financial market, reporting issues are of minor importance. To
illustrate this, I would like to cite Vreugdenhil who stated that if this really was something the large banks
were concerned about, they would have contacted the party leader and made a deal with him. In that case,
there would not have been anything that he could have done.
Wortmann of the Justice Department frequently stated that de deputy minister did not expect her to bother
him with problems in the area of reporting regulation as it was a politically minor issue.
This becomes even more clear when we consider the case from the elite theory point of view. In that case,
there are two tracks of argumentation which can be used. First, one could consider the fact that there was
discussion on this issue as evidence of the agenda power hypothesis. Those who control the political agenda
(the elite) apparently considered the segmentation question a safe issue which could be discussed freely.
Indeed, the observation made by Vreugdenhil that the banks could have blocked this point and there would
have been nothing that he could have done fits this line of thought. Second, one could argue that in this case
it was not the users who won, but merely a big firm: the previously-mentioned large investment firm.
Looking back at the entire political process, the same names and companies appear again and again, both
nationally and internationally. Therefore, one could conclude that the access of institutions and persons to
political decision-makers is of paramount importance. Such access, then, is specified by the institutional
position of the potential participant. Illustrative is the role of the Council on Annual Reporting. Due to the
blockade of the users and auditors delegation of the workinggroup’s proposals, it became possible to set
favourable requirements for users in law. However, the composition of the Council suggests that joining it is
not simple. At the least, one requires a thorough knowledge of financial reporting. The representativity of the
Council has been an issue of debate in the Second Chamber [22196 no. 7, p.2]. At any rate, membership of
this institution provides ample opportunity to influence in accordance with elite theory predictions.
Moreover, the political process as such has characteristics of the neo-corporatist system. On several
occasions, the government involved interested parties in the preparation of the regulation. Indeed, it is
departmental policy to encourage involvement of the companies in drafting laws pertaining to highly
complex and technical matters such as financial reporting. In fact, the Justice Department intended to
formulate only very general requirements based on the NVB/VvV advice. This strategy clearly encourages
self-regulation. Self-regulation is a way of maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict by allowing interest-
groups to share power.
Applying Marxist theory to this case would require a different kind of analysis than was previously
undertaken in this paper. This exercise deserves more room than is available in the framework of this article.
Tentatively, however, some suggestions for the line of reasoning can be made. The core proposition of
Marxist theory is that economic power is concentrated in the hands of few. Political power is connected to
economic resources. The inequalities in social-economic relations will be reflected in the political process. As
noted above, players in the bancassurance case were largely the companies directly involved. In other words,
influence has been exercised by those in charge of vast economic resources. Those without possessions had
no vote at all in the process. Some evidence might also be found in the amazement of Wortmann at the
Justice Department, when she was asked whether she had contacted users of financial reports such as unions,
-28-the financial press, or analysts. Not only did she not contact these groups, she had not even considered the
possibility.
5. Conclusions
This study examined the political process leading to the promulgation of promulgating the draft laws 22169
and 22896, pertaining to the reporting of financial conglomerates, the lobbying efforts observed during the
process and the interaction between the government, the supervisors of banks and insurance companies, the
industry and its associations and the users and auditors of annual reports of financial conglomerates. The
results of the study are consistent with the pluralist theory of the political process. However, owing to the
relatively minor importance of the issue, the applicability of pluralist theory in issues that are considered to
be threatening to companies is not clear. Other theories on the political process, such as elite, corporatist or
Marxist, could prove to be valuable in these circumstances. More research seems to be necessary. Neverthe-
less, the study provides additional insight into the standard setting process in the Netherlands. One of the
most salient aspects of standard-setting in the Netherlands seems to be the importance of sheer coincidence.
It was by chance that Vreugdenhil knew someone in the Council on Annual Reporting, and therefore he
knew in time that the Council could not reach a decision. It was chance that the insurance Directive was
implemented right after the bank Directive, which offered Vreugdenhil the possibility to readress the
ministers regarding the segmentation issue. It was a coincidence that the chairman of the Second Chamber,
removed the insurance draft from the agenda. Who knows what would have happened if the matter had been
deliberated on the floor of the Chamber? The important role of coincidence in accounting regulation may
explain why little research has been done into the regulation process. Recently economic theory has taken up
issues such as coincidence, history and adaptability. The traditional economic notion of static equilibrium is
not adequate for evolution or process problems. Complexity considerations become an important ’explana-
tory’ element. In this ’complexity view’ bounded rationality plays an important role. Since everything is
connected and consequences of policy are not (readily) predictable, optimality becomes a less significant
notion. Then relevant criteria for policy are the viability and applicability of possible alternative actions
(Hendrikse, 1994).
This study deviates from most lobbying research in that it takes Sutton’s (1984) and Lindahl’s (1987)
suggestion seriously that accounting researchers need to know more about the standard-setting process. It is
difficult to gain knowledge about this process when applying quantitative research methods. Quantitative
research usually relies on comment letters to the standard setter to determine the position of the players and
the degree of their opposition. Lindahl (1987: 70) argues that comment letters are only one, and not
necessarily, the most effective lobbying instrument. Therefore, this study used qualitative methods, in a
case-study approach, to provide a different angle to the existing lobbying theory. Qualitative methods have
several limitations, one of the most important being the problem of interpreting the words of the respondents.
The usual precautions have been taken to enhance the reliability of the results.
An important advantage to case study is that it is possible to focus on related issues and to consider longer
periods of time. Indeed, this case study considers the period from 1990-1993. An attempt has been made to
illustrate the possible dependences between issues and time periods.
Little research has been conducted regarding standard setting in the Netherlands, that is other than
descriptive, historical research (see, for a noteable exception, Maijoor (1991)). This study may point the way
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Table 2.1. Four Theories of Regulation.
-30-ING Fortis Reaal Levob Aegon ABN/AMRO RABO
total
assets
297,836 72,410 9,625 1,315 71,406 415,090 217,051
group
equity
13,954 7,503 763,642 170 5,727 15,982 13,021
premium
income
18,858 10,504 500,760 216 7,942 - 212
interest
income













1,506 332 11,090 57,466 39,050
Table 3.1. Financial Highlights of the Companies Involved (in millions of Dutch guilders).
Source: Annual Reports 1991 and Reach
(1): in full time equivalents
-31-Segmentation Balance sheet Profit and Loss Statement
ING investments in nominal values consolidated result per activity
Reaal investments, placings and loans consolidated result per activity
except other gains and losses
Fortis separate consolidated statements
for insurance, banking, and gen-
eral activities
separate consolidated statements
for insurance, banking, and
general activities
Levob separation of equity in financial
service, other activities, and
insurance
no separate reporting
Aegon no separate reporting amount and composition of
turnover and earning before
interest and taxes of non-insur-
ance activities
ABN-AMRO no separate reporting no separate reporting
RABO segmentation of all relevant
items in both activities
segmentation of all relevant
items in both activities
Table 3.2. Separate Reporting by Financial Conglomerates in 1991.
Source: Annual Reports and Van der Tas (1993).
-32-1989 1990 1991 1992 1993




Table 3.3. Consolidated Equity Development: ING Group and NMB-Postbank.
Source: Annual Reports of ING-Group (1992) and NMB-Postbank (1990 and 1991).
-33-1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
AEGON Moret & Limperg
* MEY MEY MEY MEY
ABN KPMG KPMG M M M
AMRO Moret & Limperg MEY M M M
ABN-AMRO NA NA KPMG + MEY MEY MEY
AMEV KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG
AG\AMEV NA NA KPMG + C&L M M
Fortis NA NA NA KPMG KPMG
Levob Moret & Limperg MEY MEY MEY MEY
RABO MEY MEY MEY MEY MEY
Reaal NA NA KPMG KPMG KPMG
NMB KPMG M M M M
NN Moret & Limperg MEY MEY M M
Postbank KPMG M M M M
NMB-Postbank NA KPMG M M M
ING NA KPMG KPMG MEY MEY
Table 3.4. The Auditors of Financial Conglomerates.
Source: Annual Reports and Reach.
M: merged C&L: Coopers and Lybrand (Belgium)
NA: not applicable NN: Nationale Nederlanden
*: Moret and Limperg is the predecessor of MEY
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